INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to exhibit some of the evidence available regarding the ownership and control of Dutch listed companies that has become available as a result of the transposition of the EU Transparency Directive. At the same time, the paper describes the legal framework for the disclosure of share ownership, together with some of the specificities of the Dutch legal and institutional framework for corporate governance. As much as possible, the analysis addresses the topics suggested by the 1996-97 Work Programme of the European Corporate Governance Network.
The paper is organised as follows. Section A of the paper describes the various legal forms of enterprises in the Netherlands and exhibits basic population statistics. The purpose of this section is to place listed firms in context, and to give an idea of their relative importance in Dutch economic activity. Section B describes the framework for reporting and publicizing ownership stakes that was enacted in order to carry out the aims of the Transparency Directive. A summary of the public debate on the effectiveness of the relevant legislation, as reported in the Dutch financial press, is included. This discussion at the same time serves as a caution in interpreting the quantitative data.
Sections C and D are the heart of the paper. Section C contains descriptive statistics concerning large blockholdings in Dutch listed companies, while Section D focuses on ownership of share stakes by company insiders.
Lastly, Section E gives some information about the outside supervision of Dutch listed companies.
A. LEGAL FORMS OF ENTERPRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS

a. Types of company
A first crucial legal distinction between various types of Dutch companies concerns whether they do or do not exist as a separate legal entity (rechtspersoon) in their own right. The main point at issue here is whether the resources drawn together by the company are a separate unit, or whether they are not sharply distinguishable from the non-company related property of the parties involved.
Firms that constitute legal entities (met rechtspersoonlijkheid)
These are the largest and most important firms (NVs and BVs), together with a set of less economically important legal forms like cooperatives, associations, mutual insurance societies and foundations.
NVs and BVs (public and private limited corporations)
The naamloze vennootschap (N.V.) is an "anonymous" limited company. In 1971, a new legal form, the besloten vennootschap (B.V.) or closed limited company was introduced, at the same time that NVs were first obliged by law to publish their annual accounts. 90% of the 50,000 or so NVs existing at the time subsequently converted to BV status. BVs are generally smaller firms, and also sometimes (increasingly) used as a form of professional partnership.
Let us first consider the common features of these two legal forms:
• limited liability. In the past, in both cases this important feature has been abused for personal enrichment at the expense of creditors (assets removed and debts allowed to accumulate). As a result, there is now sharper supervision at the stage where the firm is founded, the legal accountability of managers has been strengthened and procedures to wind up empty shells put into place.
• procedures for founding a company. The legal entity is set up by a notary's deed that records the amount of capital issued, the identity of the founding executives, and the statutes, which must include the name, seat of business (which must be in the Netherlands) and goals of business, the number of shares, the provisions for replacement of executives and any procedures for blocking the transfer of shares. A declaration of approval is needed from the Minister of Justice, who can deny it if shady people are involved or the proposed statutes do not conform to the law. All this information must be registered in the handelsregister (company register maintained by the Kamer van Koophandel (Chamber of Commerce); the information required on an ongoing basis (annual accounts, etc.) is specified in articles 5-20 of the relevant law, the handelsregisterwet. Such information about individual firms is publicly available for viewing; extracts and summaries are supplied on request at cost.
• organisational structure. The company will have a management (bestuur) and a shareholder's meeting (algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders) which (unless the company is subject to the 'structural regime' described below) appoints management (bestuur) and directors (commissarissen) and approves annual accounts (unless it is a single-owner company). The management is held personally responsible for any misbehaviour prior to a bankruptcy, the presentation of misleading accounts, improper payment of taxes, taking on obligations to third parties that clearly cannot be met, and environmental damage. The shareholders' meeting has residual rights not allocated elsewhere, as welI as the right to approve annual accounts, appoint investigating accountants, increase and decrease the firm's capital, hire and fire management, appoint at least 2/3 of commissarissen and alter the statutes. By law, the statutes cannot require more than a 2/3 majority for most decisions. In many cases there will be supervisory and advisory board of directors (raad van commissarissen -I will refer to this body as the Supervisory Board) and an enterprise council (ondernemingsraad -to be referred to as Council).
• There are special regulations governing the structure of larger firms, known as the structural regime or structuurregeling. All firms which ordinarily employ at least 100 employees or at least 35 for 1/3 of normal working hours, must set up a Council. This is a body for representing and consulting the views of employees. It has a right to relevant information, a right to advise on major decisions (e.g. transfers of ownership, relocation and important investments); it can delay decisions it disagrees with for 1 month and appeal to the ondernemingskamer (company chamber) of the Amsterdam Court. Its permission is required for changes to social arrangements (pensions, working hours, wages, safety rules) and if it disagrees the employer must obtain a local judge's decision to go ahead. These and other large firms (with capital and reserves of at least ƒ25 mn, with a legal obligation to set up a Council or with at least 100 employees in the Netherlands) are also obliged to set up a Supervisory Board (raad van commissarissen) which inherits some powers otherwise held by the shareholders' meeting. Such a Board consists of at least three members; new members are appointed by coöptation by the Board itself (unless the Shareholders' Meeting or Council object), and the statutes can determine that one or more are to be government appointees. Supervisory Board members (commissarissen) have a tenure of at most 4 years. The board supervises important managerial decisions, appoints and dismisses the management board (raad van bestuur) and draws up the yearly accounts (which are subjected to shareholder approval). In practice the structuurregime gives shareholders very little say in the appointment or removal of Supervisory Board members and management, and the coöptation system is currently the topic of intense public debate.
• certification of share capital. A commonly used device for denying voting rights to shareholders is to set up an administratiekantoor (AK: administration office) that holds the original shares and issues share certificates instead. The administratievoorwaarden (conditions of administration) determine the exact status of certificate holders' rights, which usually include a right to dividends (net of administrative costs) but no voting rights at the shareholders' meeting: these are exercised by the AK. The certificates can be owner-registered or bearer; and the rules of the fondsenreglement (stock exchange listing requirements) give prerequisites for the listing of certificates. Certificate holders retain the right to attend and speak at shareholders' meetings, to challenge the legitimacy of company decisions, to obtain annual accounts for free and to call for extra meetings just like any shareholder. Certification is used as a means of protection against hostile takeovers.
• priority shares (prioriteitsaandelen) and preference shares ('prefs') : priority shares have specific control rights, for example they may have the right to make a binding nomination for the appointment of management. Prefs are sometimes issued on a temporary basis into friendly hands, not to raise capital but to change the balance of power in the shareholders' meeting; a common method of defence against hostile takeovers, that is legally permitted if it is in the interest of the company as a whole.
• enqueterecht (right to call for an investigation): shareholders or certificateholders owning at least 10% of the share capital (or ƒ500,000 nominal, whichever is lower) can request an investigation into the company's affairs by court-appointed experts.
• publication of accounts. Dutch law in this respect conforms closely to European guidelines.
The major differences between NVs and BVs are the following:
• transferability of shares. An NV can issue both bearer and registered shares (aandelen aan toonder and aandelen op naam respectively); a BV can only issue registered shares. Whereas the statutes of an NV can limit the free transferability of shares, the statutes of a BV must do so (except possibly for transfers to other existing shareholders, close family and the BV itself). Such a blokkeringsregeling (arrangement for blocking undesired transfers) can take one of two forms. Either transfers are subject to approval by an organ of the company designated in the statutes; or a right of first refusal must be given to certain persons (or persons to be determined by a designated organ of the company). And transfers require a notary's deed. Clearly, no such restrictions are possible for bearer shares; and NV status is a prerequisite for a stock exchange listing.
• constraints on the issue and buyback of shares. These are stricter for an NV than for a BV. For example, a BV can acquire up to 50% of its own issued capital; an NV only 10% without ongoing shareholder approval. In a BV, the statutes can rule out preemptive rights for existing shareholders when new capital is issued; in an NV, a decision of the shareholder meeting is required.
Other companies that are separate legal entities
These are economically less important. A brief description:
• coöperatie and onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij (cooperatives and mutual insurance societies). These are set up by a notary's deed that specifies the statutes, its name, its goals, the obligations of members, the liability of members (none, limited or full), the way it is run and the division of any proceeds at liquidation. It must register in the handelsregister and include the list of members if they are to be liable. The structuurregeling applies if the cooperative is large or has at least 100 employees. Cooperatives are rather uncommon, and mainly used in agriculture.
• Europees Economisch Samenwerkingsverband (EESV). An organisation founded by members from different countries, as described in EU ordnance # 2137.
• stichting (foundation). A stichting has no members; it is set up by a notary's deed which describes its name, purpose, location, procedures for appointing and removing management, and the destination of its surpuls. Its goal cannot be payouts to founders. It must be registered by the kamer van koophandel.
Foundations are used in the nonprofit sector and also for trade associations, pension funds and the earlier mentioned administratiekantoren.
Enterprises without a separate legal existence (zonder rechtspersoonlijkheid)
Firms that are not separate legal entities are the property of two or more legal subjects (either people or legal entities) who enter into a cooperative agreement. They include the following forms (leaving aside eenmanszaken, or single-person businesses, which are not separately regulated by law):
• maatschap (partnership): a flexible, free-form agreement between partners (known as maten or vennoten) to contribute inputs such as physical assets or skilled labour and divide the proceeds according to agreed rules (in equal proportions, if not otherwise specified). Partners are obliged not to engage in outside activities that might be harmful to the partnership. All partners are authorised to engage in its normal business; unusual decisions (e.g. the buying of new premises by a partnership of doctors) must be taken by all the partners together, or delegated by explicit arrangement. Partners are liable in equal proportion for obligations to third parties such as creditors (unless other arrangements have been specified). However, if partners take actions for which they are not authorised they are personally responsible (unless other partners have enforced the action or benefited from it). Common examples: professional personal services not requiring very large investments: doctors, lawyers, accountants, notaries.
• vennootschap onder firma (V.O.F.): a partnership similar to a maatschap, with one important difference: the partnership has afgescheiden vermogen (ringfenced assets) to which creditors of the partnership have prior recourse, before any creditors of the partners on personal account. Thus third parties cannot net out their debts to the VOF against money owed to them by partners in private capacity. Any activities pursued on behalf of the VOF give rise to claims on the entire assets of the partnership, and every partner is responsible for the entire payment and not just a pro rata share (they are hoofdelijk aansprakelijk: jointly and severally liable). The VOF is regarded as a firm with a common name (firma). The VOF must be registered in the Handelsregister, which gives a public record of its name, purpose and activities, and any limits on the powers of members (if these are overstepped, the partner concerned is personally liable towards third parties for such unauthorised actions). The VOF is a very popular legal form (there are nearly 90,000 of them). For third parties doing business with a VOF, there is more security than with a maatschap. The business which partners are authorized to conduct on behalf of the VOF is clearly stated in the handelsregister, there are assets to which those trading with the VOF have prior recourse over the private creditors of the partners, and all partners are liable for the entire debt of the VOF.
• commanditaire vennootschap (partnership with silent partners): a device for allowing one or more "silent" partners (commanditaire vennoten) to supply money to a VOF whilst limiting their liability to the amount of their contribution. The involvement of the silent partners in managerial activities is strictly proscribed. The company demographic information published by the CBS invariably uses employment as the basis for the size classification. Thus we do not have size distribution data by total assets or sales readily available. Such information is, however, in principle available for smaller subsets of all firms such as NVs, listed companies, larger companies, etc. using the REACH CD-ROM database. We reproduce here the size distribution in terms of workforce The size distribution of the different legal forms, by number of employees, in January 1994 is given in Table A .b.4. 
b. Basic Population Statistics
B. DISCLOSURE OF BLOCKHOLDINGS IN THE NETHERLANDS: THE CURRENT SITUATION
a. The legal framework for disclosure of large shareholdings
To our knowledge there is no legal obligation to disclose ownership stakes in unlisted NVs and BVs (except in the case of single-owner companies, where the identity of the owner must be recorded in the publicly accessible handelsregister together with a written account of all transactions between himself and the company). If the company has issued registered shares (aandelen op naam), as is the case for all BVs and many NVs, its management obviously keeps a register of shareholdings (aandelenregister), which must include the names and addresses of all the shareholders. But there is no legal obligation to make this information freely and conveniently accessible to the general public.
For listed companies (which must clearly be NVs, for BVs do not have freely transferable shares), shareholders are subject to the disclosure requirements of the law that carries out the EU Transparency Directive 88/627, namely the Wet Melding Zeggenschapsrecht (henceforth the WMZ). Shareholders in all NVs incorporated under Dutch law and listed on a European Union stock exchange must notify both the company itself and the Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer or STE (a foundation set up in 1988 to surpervise share trading on behalf of the Minister of Finance) of any purchases or sales of share stakes which cross the boundaries of 5, 10, 25, 50 or 66 2/3 % of issued capital.
The first WMZ went into effect on February 1 1992. Recently, some of the more glaring defects of the law have been repaired, with a new version of the WMZ replacing the old one as of June 1 1997 2 . As our data in this paper were collected under the old regime, we will describe both, and give a brief review of the public debate surrounding the WMZ.
Under both versions of the WMZ, investors are obliged to notify a listed company of any purchases or sales of its shares which lead their share stake to cross the notifiable boundaries of 5, 10, 25, 50 or 66 2/3 %. This obligation to notify applies to both voting rights and ownership (income) rights separately. At the same time, the investor must indicate whether the stake is indirect (middelijk), that is, held via a daughter company or a third party; and whether the stake represents a potential (potentieel) stake rather than a current one, for example in case of a convertible bond or a warrant.
The listed company concerned is obliged to transmit this information promptly to the STE, which under the new law publishes the announcement in the financial press (in practice, Het Financieele Dagblad) in a standardised format, after verifying the information, after between 5 and 9 calendar days 3 . (Under the old law, the company itself was responsible for making an announcement in a newspaper with nationwide circulation. But it was felt that direct publication of the information by the STE would be more transparent and less error-prone.)
A major source of concern with the share stake database maintained by the STE is that over time, it has become increasingly contaminated. The main problem is that share stakes can and do cross the notifiable percentage boundaries whenever the total outstanding share capital of the company changes; for example as a result of employee option plans, stock dividends, or mergers paid for by issuing shares. A large shareholder, who takes no active part in this modification of the denominator, has no obligation to report the resulting change in his percentage stake even if his percentage stake crosses a notifiable boundary as a result of the dilution. Thus over time the quality of the database, which is based on initial notifications of percentage stakes, has deteriorated. The STE has pleaded strenuously but unsuccessfully for the new law to institute a periodic (say annual) obligation for companies to report their total share capital and the holdings of their known large shareholders, so that the STE's database would give a more accurate picture of current blockholdings. The government and a majority in Parliament felt that periodic disclosure would impose an unnecessary burden on companies and large shareholders, though leftwing parties generally spoke out in favour of more disclosure. The STE is now sufficiently concerned by the contamination of its database that it has threatened again (in May 1997) to lock up its data base and stop providing WMZ data to third parties who request it (mostly multinationals, institutional investors, analysts and the press) and to limit its role to publishing the original notifications in the press. The STE views the WMZ as a means of providing greater transparency regarding the ownership structure of listed companies. The Minister of Finance, however, indicated to Parliament in 1996 (prior to the adoption of the revised law) that he felt its role is simply to make market movements visible. Opposition to the tightening of the law was not based on considerations of administrative cost alone: since 1995, a pressure group to protect the privacy of large individual shareholders has been pursuing a lawsuit to limit information dissemination by the STE.
The new WMZ repairs several other deficiencies of the old law:
• One important lacuna concerned pre-existing large shareholders of companies listed after the original WMZ went into effect; such shareholders were not obliged to notify their stakes. From now on all initial shareholders in newly listed companies must disclose any large stakes 4 (initiele meldingsplicht).
• Professional intermediaries (banks, underwriters of new issues) who retain stakes of over 5% 'on the shelf' (emissierestanten) 3 months after a new issue or placing, must disclose such stakes as they will be regarded as part of their investment rather than trading portfolio.
reasonably be considered price-sensitive, so that the information is likely to be made public on the exchange before the STE publishes it. 4 Large shareholders in the 70 or so companies that were listed between February 1992 and June 1997 were given a July 1 1997 deadline to disclose their holdings; but by then, only 20 notifications had been received, some of which were incorrect, whilst the STE was expecting a total of about 280, namely roughly four notifications per company involved!
• Custodians (bewaarders) are now exempt from the obligation to disclose provided that they have no control rights.
• There is now a standard form on which information must be disclosed to the STE, and the information must include the exact date on which the notification obligation arose and details of how the stake is held (e.g. via a daughter company, "for the account of", or via a voting agreement) • The law was rephrased in terms of six "bands" (0-5, 5-10, 10-25, 25-50, 50-66 2/3, 66 2/3-up); shareholders must report any movement of their stake into a different band. In the past, people did not seem to understand that they also had to disclose whenever their stake crossed a boundary downwards (a significant source of inaccuracy in the STE database).
• Open-end funds or unit trusts (BMVKs: beleggingsmaatschappijen met veranderlijk kapitaal, or investment companies with varying capital, who buy in or expand their own share capital in response to investor demand at a price close to the intrinsic value of the underlying portfolio) now have weaker disclosure obligations, with 0-25% treated as one band.
• If a natural person discloses a stake, his/her "daughter" company does not need to do so as well (this was already the case for group companies under the old WMZ). Thus double notifications are reduced.
• The STE is empowered to correct inaccurate data.
Up to the end of May 1997 there have been a total of 3300 WMZ disclosures. The notifying listed company pays the processing cost to the STE, currently running at about ƒ2300.-excluding the cost of newspaper publication.
b. Public availability of data
The STE itself does not provide a record of disclosures in electronic form; indeed, in May 1997 it announced that it would no longer provide data to third parties at all because of its concerns about the inaccuracy of its database. Starting in 1992, when the WMZ first went into effect, the main Dutch financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad has periodically published a supplement with a complete overview of all disclosed blockholdings, based on the original situation in 1992 adjusted by intervening announcements of changes 5 .
The database has over time become increasingly inaccurate for a number of reasons. First of all, when shareholders' proportional stakes are changed, not by any trading of their own but by changes in the total amount of issued capital of the company, they do not need to report such changes. In addition, stakeholders tend to be forgetful about notifying decreases in their stakes. There have also been cases of large shareholders attempting to avoid or delay disclosure in order to hide their controlling interest from the public eye 6
. Lastly, pre-existing large shareholders in the 70 or so companies newly listed between February 1992 and June 1997 have not until July 1997 been obliged to disclose their stakes.
The Financieele Dagblad has taken some measures to improve the accuracy of the data:
• Whenever there is a series of filings by the same shareholder in the same company, only the most recent one has been kept • Any disclosures of stakes strictly below 5% in the STE database have been eliminated • "Remnants" of overlapping stakes (direct and indirect), arising after only one sale is reported, have been removed • Some disclosures that have been published in the press but apparently not sent to the STE are included.
The data is organised in the FD as follows. For each blockholding six categories are distinguished: a kapitaalbelang (includes b and c): total ownership (capital, dividend) rights b middellijk kapitaalbelang: indirect ownership (held by a subsidiary or a firm with which the filing firm has a long term agreement on joint policies in exercising the voting rights) c potentieel kapitaalbelang: potential ownership, for example from warrants, convertibles, or call options. d stemrecht (includes e and f): voting rights e middellijk stemrecht: indirect voting rights f potentieel stemrecht: potential voting rights Clearly, these data are imperfect and further cleaning up work would be desirable before they are used in empirical research:
• indirect holdings need to be clarified. Sometimes in-depth perusal of the original notifications may be enough; but sometimes it may be necessary to contact the persons and/or companies involved, in hopes that they will be forthcoming with the information;
• the earlier mentioned deterioration of the data set over time due to changes in the denominator is hard to deal with unless the relevant law is tightened;
• share stakes of directors and company insiders are not included in the data base and need to be collected separately.
For all its faults, the FD database is the only one currently available, and in the next sections we will base our quantitative analysis on it.
C. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND VOTING RIGHTS: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
a. The data
As mentioned before, the Dutch disclosure requirements concern listed firms and we will focus on those alone. Our ownership data for Dutch listed companies are taken from the annual overview published in the appendix of Het Financieele Dagblad on May 28, 1996. The data describe the situation on May 8, 1996. The sample consists of 137 Dutch industrial companies listed on the Amsterdam Exchange. Only blockholdings of at least 5% are taken into account.
As in The Netherlands no groups of listed companies are found, we do not analyse groups separately. In addition, we focus on direct holdings only.
Regarding indirect holdings, we can only obtain information regarding stakes of listed firms in other listed firms. Thus the data for indirect holdings would very incomplete. In any case, the data for the listed firms only reveals few and minor stakes, and no controlling stakes.
Many Dutch companies issue common shares directly to administrative offices (administratiekantoren) which in turn issue depository receipts after detaching voting rights. Ownership stakes reported by these administrative offices are excluded. Trusts for non-paid up preferred stock are also excluded. In addition, we adjust the data, wherever possible, for double reporting.
We make three adjustments to the data reported in Het Financieele Dagblad. First, many Dutch firms issue a large proportion of their shares in nonvoting certificate form via an administrative office (administratiekantoor), as described in Section A.a of this paper. The filings of such administrative offices are removed from the data set, as the ownership structure of the AK itself is unknown (though it is generally controlled by the company's management). Second, potential stakes are removed from the data. In general, the potential rights are non-paid up preferred stock placed in a foundation (stichting preferente aandelen or stichting continuïteit). Third, the indirect stakes may lead to double counting, as both the subsidiary and the parent may have filed the same stake; indeed, if the parent is a person and not a company, that is obligatory under the pre-June 1997 law. We try to correct for this by eliminating the stake of the subsidiary. The following example illustrates our procedure: For Wegener we would make the following adjustments. First, a 99.998% stake of administration office ('Wegener, St.Adm.ktr') is reported. This entry will be deleted. Second, a 99.99% potential stake of preferred stock is reported by a foundation ('Wegener, St.Pref.Aand'). This entry will be deleted. Third, we investigate the indirect stakes in columns b and e. In the row an indirect stake of Amev/VSB is reported. The problem is that we cannot find the direct shareholder, because no stake of the same magnitude is reported. This entry will not be deleted. Mr C.J Houwert reported an indirect stake of 21.27%. Van der Loeff Beheer has reported a stake of exactly the same percentage. It is very likely that mr C.J. Houwert controls Van der Loeff Beheer. For this reason this latter entry will be deleted. As with the stake of Amev/VSB, the stake of Telegraaf shows no clear resemblance with the other stakes. We choose to remove double entries as much as possible by eliminating the subsidiaries.
Example: WEGENER
b. Analysis of findings
Table C.b.1 represents average ownership (of income rights) by company size and ownership stake classes. We find that the average size of the largest stake is 28.16%. There is a sharp decline for the second largest stake; here the average is 9.19%. We also report average stakes in companies classified into different size groups based on total assets at the end of 1995. Here we observe that average largest block (in percentage terms) decreases as the size of companies increases. For example, for companies in the smallest size category (total assets less than ƒ70m) the average largest stake is 35.45%, while for companies in the largest size category (total assets over ƒ2000m) the average stake is 28.16%. Graphical plots are provided in Figures 1 to 4 at the end of the paper. Table C .b.5 describes the use of administratiekantoren. We selected all shareholdings labelled administratiekantoor or stichting continuiteit ("continuity foundation"), excluding any stakes that represent a potential rather than a current interest. The AK's function is to detach voting rights from the shares that it controls, passing them on to investors in nonvoting certificate form; control of the AK's votes typically rests with a foundation board appointed by the underlying firm and/or its initial shareholders. 55 of the 137 firms in the sample used this device; and, as can be seen from the table, in the majority of these cases more than 2/3 of the firm's share capital was certificated.
Table C.b.6 describes a common device for countering the threat of takeovers: the use of potential capital, contingent claims which are only issued under specified circumstances, such as when the continuity of the firm is under threat (in other words, in case of takeover threats). These potential claims are typically held by a body called a stichting preferente aandelen or a stichting continuiteit. We limit our table to those firms where potential capital is at least 25% of the currently outstanding capital (thus excluding various individuals and employee share option schemes which typically hold no more than about a 10% stake). Note that potential stakes can and do exceed 100% in some cases, as the denominator is currently outstanding capital. We find that 35 of the 137 sample firms have important amounts of potential capital; indeed, in 27 of these the amount of potential capital is 98% or above, suggesting that the purpose of the potential stakes is to achieve a voting majority of 50% under the control of company management in any circumstances which trigger the the potential voting rights.
The conversion of shares into nonvoting certificates and the use of potential shareholdings do not seem to be substitute defence devices, as many firms use both. 18 firms both use an AK and have outstanding potential capital rights of over 25%. Size classes are defined in Table C .b.1. (0) 10 Note: All holdings that are labelled administratiekantoor or stichting continuiteit are included unless they represent potential rather than actual capital. In seven cases there were two (rather than one) AKs involved. 
D INSIDE SUPERVISION
Most listed Dutch companies are large enough to fall under the structuurregime described in Section A.a, whereby the supervisory board is appointed by coöptation without direct shareholder input, and the management board is appointed by the supervisory board. There is much current debate on whether the shareholders and the employees of companies should have greater powers to appoint, re-appoint and depose Supervisory Board members. Amsterdam) . At the same time, the governance structure of the exchange has been changed from a members' organisation to a straight commercial venture, a joint-stock company (NV), with share capital that will be listed in the near future. Currently ownership of the parent company, the Amsterdamse Beursholding, is as follows:
• members of the Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel (50%)
• institutional investors (25%)
• listed firms (25%)
This major change has coincided with a considerable upheaval in the regulatory structure. In particular, a working agreement reached between the AEX and the STE (Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer) in December 1996 confirmed a major shift away from self-regulation by the exchange to regulation by an independent outside body, the STE, whose supervisory role is now much broader than it has been to date. Responsibilities of the AEX and the STE have been divided as follows. The STE will carry out all control and supervision tasks that are not "exchange-specific"; in particular, it will now be in charge of vetting and licensing those who want to participate in securities trading, thus in effect controlling access to exchange membership. The STE will also monitor and verify the maand-en kwartaalrapportages (monthly and quarterly financial reports) of member firms; these are used to determine whether firms are financially sound enough to meet the criteria for permission to trade on own account or, in general, to engage in exchange-traded securities business. Meanwhile, the compliance division of the AEX will continue to monitor members' day-to-day position-taking. The AEX will also continue to take charge of evaluating candidates for a new listing, and approve prospectuses and other documents put forth by firms who issue listed securities.
The impetus for this shift away from self-regulation is partly derived from public perception of past failures. In two notorious cases of bankruptcies of securities houses, the exchange members' self-regulatory body (the vereniging voor effectenhandel) had failed to take action despite clear signs that there were problems. The Nusse Brink case concerned a firm that was allowed to continue trading for own account even when its equity capital fell below the prescribed norm; the authorities failed to verify the financial information provided by the firm despite clear signs of administrative failures within it. In the case of Regio Effect, its directors were accepted as exchange members even though it was known that they had been denied options exchange membership and fired from their previous banking jobs because of a massive suspected fraud involving options contracts. They subsequently continued with a host of unauthorised and fraudulent practices (misappropriation of clients' funds, misleading disclosures of their financial position, settlement at false stock prices, etc.); the authorities were extremely slow to respond to signs of these activities thrown up by routine monitoring.
At the same time, the conversion of the exchange into a commercial organisation also makes a self-regulatory approach to supervision less appropriate.
Formally, the supervision of securities trading is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The Minister, however, has delegated most of his tasks and authorities to the STE, which in turn supervises the selfregulation by the exchange. Some changes to the current version of the law governing securities business (the Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer 1995, or WTE for short) are required to delimit the areas of competence and adjust to the new regime 7
. A revised WTE is currently being debated in parliament.
Meanwhile, some further changes are expected in the longer term to cope with the increased degree of integration between banking, securities business and insurance. Many integrated Dutch financial firms, such as Fortis and ING, are commingling these activities, necessarily creating overlap between the authorities responsible for supervision, and creating an impetus for a possible future merger of the three relevant authorities:
• the STE for securities business;
• De Nederlandsche Bank for banking supervision; and • the Verzekeringskamer for insurance companies. So far cooperation between these authorities is mostly limited to producing a joint register for vetting individuals who wish to run businesses in these areas. An added reason for integration of the three authorities is that financial fraud so often has an international dimension. The Bank for International Settlements has recently suggested that placing supervisory authority in one hand within each country would facilitate liason among supervisors in different countries.
Listing requirements
As of January 1 1997, the Minister of Finance has awarded the status of "competent authority" for purposes of the evaluation of new candidates for listing to the AEX 8 (formerly, the vereniging voor effectenhandel was in charge). Firms who want a listing must sign the Fondesenreglement 9 and the Modelcode. The Fondesenreglement sets down trading rules and listing requirements such as the size and composition of the capital issued, and the contents of the prospectus. The Modelcode contains agreements about, among other things, trading in the listed company's own shares and options by company officials. These rules, developed over time by the vereniging voor effectenhandel, form the basis for trading on the AEX. • a history of at least five years.
• in at least three of these five years a profit must have been reported.
• at least ƒ10.000.000 equity capital.
• at least 10% of the equity capital must be available for trading with a market value of at least ƒ10.000.000.
• a listed firm has to be a N.V. or a cooperatie.
• a listed firm has to obey to additional requirements set down in the fondsenreglement. The listing requirements on the Nieuwe Markt are:
• a history of at least three years.
• at least ECU 1.000.000 equity capital.
• at least ECU 1.000.000 (market value) of the equity capital must be available for trading.
• quarterly disclosure.
• the same additional requirements set down in the fondsenreglement apply.
• lock-up: initial shareholders with a stake larger than 5% are not allowed to sell shares during a certain period.
• a sponsor (bank or brokerage house) is required during the first three years of listing. The Nieuwe Markt is linked to the French and Belgian second-tier markets in the Euro-NM initiative, an attempt to develop a unified trading forum for small European companies.
The rules with respect to the distribution of information before a public offering are framed in the Fondsenreglement. Some rules are: an unlisted security is not eligible for trading until a prospectus has been published (article 8). The prospectus must be published: a) in a Dutch newspaper that is distributed nationwide or has a large circulation, or b) as a brochure which must be available free of charge to the general public (article 20, paragraph 2). Every new potentially price-sensitive fact that becomes known during the period in between the determination of the contents of the prospectus and the first day of trading, must be published in a supplementary document (article 21, paragraph 1).
Insider trading
Rules regarding the use of inside information are framed in article 46 of the current law on the supervision of securities trading, the Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer 1995. In addition, the Modelcode that forms a part of the AEX listing agreement bans trading by high-ranking company officials at sensitive times such as the period around the publication of company financial results.
At the moment proposals for amendment of the law are under consideration by the parliament. The proposed changes would lighten the burden of proof somewhat, as it has proved extremely difficult to prosecute even blatant cases of misuse of inside information successfully. In particular, the prosecutor will no longer need to prove that it was clear in advance how the stock price would move. There is also some debate about making it possible for insider trading to be prosecuted under civil rather than criminal law, which a correspondingly less stringent burden of proof. In addition, the law is to be more closely aligned with European guidelines; and the prohibition is to be extended to initial public offerings. There are also proposals regarding a meldingsplicht (obligation to disclose) for securities trading by certain individuals, including supervisionary board members (commissarissen) and executives, associated with the issuing firm. Some other issues that are being debated are the regulation of employee share option plans to prevent related insider trading, the recognition of "Chinese walls" within banks and securities firms (so that a division can still trade even if price-sensitive information exists elsewhere in the firm), share issuance and underwriting procedures, and clarification of the legality of building up stakes in a company that is to be taken over.
The rules are enforced as follows. Suspicious dealings, possibly uncovered by the exchange's routine surveillance procedures, are investigated by the STE, in co-operation with the Ministry of Finance's Economische Controle Dienst and the Openbaar Ministerie or OM (which prosecutes suspected offenders if the evidence is strong enough).
The OM is severely understaffed and therefore quite slow, and it has in the past not always taken a very tough line 10 . Moreover the burden of proof is very high, and the collapse of an important insider trading case (HCS) generated a public perception that inside information can be abused with impunity in The Netherlands. More recently, in the Weveler case in 1997, the OM has been more successful, obtaining a conviction in a case without absolute proof or incriminating witness declarations, just strong circumstantial evidence. Several other well-publicised cases are currently pending.
Possible penalties for insider trading include fines, disgorgement of profits and a prison sentence.
Takeover rules
Rules regarding conduct in takeover situations are pelled out in the Merger Conduct Code of a national body, the Social and Economic Council (the sociaal economische raad or SER).This code gives rules for negotiations leading up to a possible merger or participation. The Merger Conduct Code is designed to protect two parties: shareholders and employees. With respect to shareholders: (i) all holders of shares for which a bid is made should have access to as complete and accurate as possible information regarding the merits of the bid; (ii) they should all receive equal opportunities to accept or reject the bid; (iii) unjustified gains to inside shareholders as a result of inside information should be prevented. Preventing the abuse of inside information is achieved by obliging every managerial and supervisory board member of the company involved to notify the above mentioned SER of their shareholdings and their transactions therein (both direct and indirect) during the six months preceding the merger announcement. If a third party makes a higher bid in the meantime, the management of the company that is taking over must promptly make public the 10 In a case that came to public attention as a result of journalists' efforts in February 1997, the public prosecutor had in 1995 agreed to a quiet settlement even though the defendant admitted guilt and the facts of the case were unambiguously established. Only after the case came to light in 1997, was the person concerned (a senior ABN-Amro bank employee) forced to step down from his job. measures on its part to which this bid gives rise. To shareholders who retain their shares after the bid, no higher bid may be made during the three following years, other than with the permission of the SER-commission or in regular stock exchange trading. In early 1996 the SER brought out an advisory document, proposing, amongst other things, to give a legal foundation to the SER merger rules. This could ameliorate a number of deficiencies in the rules.
As mentioned before, the listing agreement with the AEX also places some limits on companies' arsenal of defenses against hostile takeovers, as well as on trading by insiders.
Auditors
The annual and semi-annual financial reports published by companies are subjected to auditor scrutiny before release. In recent years some auditing firms have changed their structure to create limited liability. There are some wellknown cases where auditors have been brought to court, for example, the SmitTrafo initial public offering and the Vie d'Or case. 100.00 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5-S10
